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THE ABILITY TO PAY DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
One of the most established principles in the civil law is
that one who does damage to another must make full repara-
tion.1 In Louisiana, the principle is embodied in Civil Code
articles 1934 and 2315, which the courts have interpreted as
requiring that in matters ex contractu2 and ex delicto3 quan-
tum should be commensurate with the degree of harm sus-
tained. Louisiana courts have established, however, an ex-
ception to the otherwise well-accepted rule: in certain cases,
the amount of judgment will be reduced because of the defen-
dant's inability to pay.4 In a recent case,5 the First Circuit
Court of Appeal explained the rationale of the "ability to
pay" doctrine:
It is well settled that, in awarding damages, a trial court
may consider the ability of a defendant to respond in
judgment. The foregoing rule is based on the equitable
principle that courts will not grant vain and useless relief
or render a judgment incapable of execution.6
1. See Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33, 43-46 (1855) (thorough
discussion of French doctrine regarding full reparation) and Code Napoleon
arts. 1149, 1151-52, 1382 (1804); Marr, The Punitive Damages Heresy, 2 SO. L.
Q. 1-4 (1917); Urk v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 69, 70
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
2. Womack v. Sternberg, 247 La. 566, 172 So. 2d 683 (1965). Full repara-
tion in contractual situations is also indicated by the language in LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 1928, 2769.
3. E.g., Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1006, 245 So. 2d 151, 155
(1971); Black v. Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 33, 43-46 (1855). See also Janvier,
Punitive Damages in Louisiana, 10 LOYOLA L. J. 26 (1929); Note, 17 TUL.
L. REV. 658 (1943).
4. See Jagers v. Royal Indemn. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Jackson v.
Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722 (1924); Rogers v. Hiram J. Allen Lumber Co.,
129 La. 900, 57 So. 166 (1912); Daly v. Kiel, 106 La. 170, 30 So. 254 (1901);
Loyacano v. Jurgens, 50 La. Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898); Williams v. McManus,
38 La. Ann. 161 (1886). See also Becnel v. Ward, 286 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (1974); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223
(La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 So. 2d 694 (1973); Williams v. Garner, 268
So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Nicholas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So. 2d
568 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 256 La. 1144, 241 So. 2d 251 (1970), on
appeal following remand, 254 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
261 La. 229, 259 So. 2d 75 (1972).
5. Williams v. Garner, 268 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
6. Id. at 61.
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Source of the Doctrine
Louisiana's "ability to pay" doctrine is not derived from
civilian sources of Louisiana law as no ancestral French or
Spanish doctrine similar to the Louisiana rule existed. In
France, the amount of damages has always been determined by
the amount of loss sustained, without regard to the defen-
dant's financial status.7 Absence of a French exception to the
rule of complete reparation is consistent with the failure of
the Code Napoleon to grant the trial court discretionary au-
thority in assessing damages.8 French law protected an im-
poverished defendant only after judgment, in the form of a
"delay of grace"9 and cession. 10 Similarly, the only protection
accorded a low-income defendant under Spanish law was
post-judgment relief."
The Louisiana practice of considering the defendant's
financial condition in determining compensatory damages
could be an outgrowth of the common law doctrine of punitive
damages. Traditionally, common law courts have considered
the defendant's financial condition in determining the
amount of punitive damages. 1 2 Before 1917 Louisiana courts
also awarded punitive damages,' 3 although such awards were
7. See Code Napoleon arts. 1149, 1151-52, 1382; 6 & 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAIT], PRATIQUP, DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(QAIS no 681 at 922 & n° 855 at 159
(1930).
8. See Code Napoleon arts. 1149, 1151-52 (1804); 4 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS § 308 (6th ed. Bartin 1965) in A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 1 CIVIL
LAW-TRANSLATIONS 110-15 (1965). Louisiana's unique principle of trial court
discretion in measuring damages had its beginning in the Civil Code of 1825.
Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1928 (1825) with La. Digest of 1808 arts. 49, 51-52.
See also McGary v. City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440 (1849).
9. Code Napoleon art. 1244 (1804). "The period or delay of grace is used to
moderate the pressure which a relentless creditor may exercise against a
debtor in good faith but in financial difficulties. When the debt is due, or
where there has never been a term either legal or contractual, the judge may
grant a delay to the debtor in consideration of his position." 2 M. PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, nos. 369-73(A), 435 at 213-15 (12th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. transl. 1939).
10. Code Napoleon arts. 1265-70 (1804). "The insolvent debtor ceased to
be subject to imprisonment by abandoning his property to his creditors in
payment of what he owed them." 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1,
no. 178 at 107-08 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1939).
11. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, bk. 5, tit. 14, L. 12 & bk. 5, tit. 15 (Scott transl.
1931).
12. E.g., Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393, 62 A.L.R. 806
(1956).
13. Louisiana courts apparently began awarding punitive or exemplary
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unknown in French and Spanish law.14 Perhaps in borrowing
the doctrine of punitive damages from the common law,
Louisiana courts also incorporated the related practice of
considering the defendant's economic status in setting the
punitive amount. Since Louisiana courts frequently failed to
specify whether the quantum awarded was punitive or com-
pensatory, 15 a defendant's inability to pay, relevant at com-
mon law for assessing punitive damages only,'6 may have
been considered in Louisiana for reducing a lump sum con-
sisting of both compensatory and punitive damages. Follow-
ing the abolition of punitive damages in Louisiana,'17 the prac-
tice of considering the defendant's ability to pay may have
been retained with respect to fixing compensatory damages.
However, two considerations weaken the theory that the
ability to pay doctrine evolved from the common law doctrine
of punitive damages.' 8 First, the confused state of the law
regarding punitive damages prior to 191719 makes it uncer-
tain whether Louisiana courts used the doctrine in assessing
punitive damages. 20 Second, the reason for considering the
damages in the 1830's. See McGary v. City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440 (1849);
Summers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 161 (1836); Carlin v. Stewart, 2 La. 73 (1830). In
1917, the Louisiana Supreme Court held awards of punitive damages for
personal injuries to be invalid under Louisiana law. Vincent v. Morgan's La.
& T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 540 (1917). The principle of punitive
damages still remains in Louisiana law but in less obvious form. Marr, The
Punitive Damages Heresy, 2 SO. L.Q. 1 (1917).
14. French and Spanish law treated damages only as a means of repara-
tion. See information at notes 10, 11, supra.
15. E.g., Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 1043, 74
So. 540, 546 (1917).
16. At common law, evidence of the defendant's ability to pay has been
frequently admitted so that the trial court may decide what amount of
damages will justly punish the defendant. Conversely, common law courts
have steadfastly refused to admit such evidence for the purposes of fixing the
amount of compensatory damages. Eisenhauer v. Burger, 431 F.2d 833 (6th
Cir. 1970); Thornburg v. Perleberg, 158 N.W.2d 188 (N.D. 1968); Wilmoth v.
Limestone Prod. Co., 255 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
17. See note 13, supra.
18. The doctrine of considering the defendant's financial condition in
setting quantum "is clearly an atavistic outcropping of the rule of punitive,
or exemplary, damages . . . ." McMahon, Damages Based Upon What the
Traffic Will Bear, 11 LOYOLA L. REV. 115, 116 (1930). Accord, Note, 19 TUL. L.
REV. 626 (1945). See also Janvier, Punitive Damages in Louisiana, 10 LOYOLA
L. REV. 26 (1929).
19. See note 13, supra.
20. The author discovered no cases where a Louisiana court explicitly
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defendant's ability to pay in fixing punitive damages 21 differs
from the purpose served in considering the factor in the as-
sessment of compensatory damages,2 2 making it unlikely that
the courts would have continued the practice after the aboli-
tion of punitive damages in 1917.
Another explanation for incorporation of the ability to
pay doctrine into Louisiana law is found in article 1934(3) of
the Louisiana Civil Code, which grants broad discretion to the
judge or jury in determining the amount of damages. 23 Such
discretion serves to modify the general rule that damages
should be commensurate with the actual loss sustained by
the plaintiff.24 In exercising their discretion, Louisiana courts
may simply have thought it appropriate to add the defen-
dant's ability to pay to the other factors considered in the
assessment of damages. For example, in the early case of
Williams v. McManus,25 the Louisiana Supreme Court di-
minished a money judgment against a defendant of "limited
means," holding that "the jury did not make a proper and
commensurate allowance and went beyond the limits to be
observed in such cases. 26 The court implied that a jury
should consider a poor defendant's ability to respond in com-
pensatory damages when exercising its discretion in making
an award.27
considered the defendant's economic situation in the assessment of punitive
damages.
21. The reason is that the amount which would adequately punish one
man might be inadequate in punitive effect upon another by reason of their
difference in financial condition. See, e.g., Suzore v. Rutherford, 35 Tenn.
App. 678, 251 S.W.2d 129 (1952); Whitfield v. Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311, 320
(1866).
22. The defendant's economic means is considered in Louisiana in award-
ing compensatory damages so a "defendant may not be bankrupted and left
destitute upon society and the state." Benoit v. International Harvester Co.,
251 So. 2d 389, 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934(3) provides: "In the assessment of damages
under this rule [regarding contractual obligations], as well as in the case of
offenses, quasi offenses and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to
the judge or jury . . ." (emphasis added).
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934; text at notes 1-3, supra.
25. 38 La. Ann. 161 (1886).
26. Id. at 163.
27. Because Williams was decided before 1917, arguably the court's ap-
plication of the ability to pay doctrine to compensatory damages (instead of
to punitive damages as at common law) did not result from Louisiana's
abolition of punitive awards.
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Requisites for Diminution
Diminution is generally proper when the record conclu-
sively shows the defendant's inability to respond fully in
damages. 2s Louisiana jurisprudence is unclear, however, as to
the type of damages susceptible to diminution. For example,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal mentioned that the doc-
trine is available to a defendant sued in tort,29 but the Fourth
Circuit in Becnel v. Ward30 implied that the applicability of
the doctrine is coextensive with the discretion granted the
trial court by stating that "special damages may not be re-
duced [based on the defendant's meager means], since they
are not a matter of the trial court's discretion like general
damages are." 31 Since article 1934 allows discretion in cases
of offenses, quasi offenses, contracts where the object is any-
thing but the payment of money, and quasi contracts, the
Becnel decision indicates that the defendant's ability to pay is
properly considered in all tort and contract cases except those
involving contracts for the payment of money. Finally, the
Becnel court specifically excludes special damages from re-
duction based on a defendant's meager means, as only "gen-
eral damages [are] clearly within the range of the trial
judge's ... discretion .... "32
The complications of diminution increase when several
defendants are liable. If the defendants are liable in sol-
ido, the evidence must establish that all defendants are un-
able to respond financially before diminution is proper.33 Such
28. Seither v. Poter, 194 So. 467 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940). Cf. Nichols v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So. 2d 568, 578-79 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970). Because
application of the principle of diminution is in the trial judge or jury's
discretion, LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934(3), any attempt to suggest an absolute list
of requisites for diminution would be futile.
29. In Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223, 233 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
279 So. 2d 694 (1973), the court said, "Our jurisprudence is established that
the defendant in a tort action may present evidence which tends to show his
inability to pay general damages" (emphasis added).
30. 286 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 900
(1974).
31. Id. at 733.
32. Id. Accord, Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir.).
33. In Howell v. Knight, 193 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), the
plaintiff sued two defendants. Based on his finding that one defendant was
impecunious, the trial judge diminished the judgment in solido against both
co-defendants. However, on appeal, the First Circuit held that while diminu-
tion would have been proper if only the impecunious defendant were in-
volved, the trial judge committed manifest error by imputing the same condi-
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a requirement eliminates the problems that could arise if
judgment were reduced only as to one defendant liable in
solido and the other defendant later demands contribution. 34
However, when one defendant's solidary liability is based
upon his contractual obligation to indemnify the other defen-
dant, no subsequent contribution problems can develop and
diminution should be allowed when the award surpasses the
maximum limits of indemnification and the indemnitee is un-
able to pay the balance. 35
If evidence of the defendant's limited means is made part
of the record, the trial court must consider the evidence. For
example, in Davis v. McKey, 36 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal held that the trial court erred in failing to consider
evidence of the defendant's limited ability to respond in dam-
ages, and quantum was reduced accordingly. 37
If the defendant does not raise the issue of his inability to
pay, the trial judge arguably may raise the issue on his own
motion. Such judicial initiative is consistent with the dis-
cretionary power given to the court by Louisiana Civil Code
article 1934(3) and does not undermine the purpose of the
doctrine, which is equitable treatment of the impoverished
defendant. 3 In Davis, the trial judge on his own volition
tion to the other defendant. The same rationale was applied in Seither v.
Poter, 194 So. 467 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940), where the appeal court allowed
diminution in a solidary judgment against two impecunious defendants.
34. In Ryan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 232 La. 831, 95 So. 2d 328 (1957), the trial court held
two defendants, one a natural person and the other a corporation, to be liable
in solido. The lower court reduced the judgment in solido because the natural
defendant was impecunious. In modifying the trial court's judgment, the
Court of Appeal stated that the rule of diminution "cannot have application
in this case if for no other reason than that Allstate Ins. Co. is liable in solido
with Leslie Evans for the damages sustained by the plaintiffs. If one amount
were to be assessed against Leslie Evans on account of his impoverished
condition and a higher amount assessed against the other solidary debtor,
much confusion and legal difficulties might possibly arise in the future as at
some time or other the question of contribution as between the solidary
debtors might come in for discussion."
35. See Becnel v. Ward, 286 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (1974); Nichols v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 So. 2d 159
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 261 La. 229, 259 So. 2d 75 (1972).
36. 167 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 910, 168 So. 2d
822 (1964).
37. See also Smith v. Girley, 242 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), par-
tially rev'd on other grounds, 260 La. 223, 255 So. 2d 748 (1971).
38. Benoit v. International Harvester Co., 251 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1971).
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offered the defendant the opportunity to introduce evidence
showing his financial condition, even though the defendant
had not previously introduced such evidence nor alleged his
inability to pay in his pleadings. 39 The judge explained the
situation to the defendant in this manner:
I'm just trying to get into the record whatever you're
entitled to under the law, but I want to make it clear to
you that this is not compulsory on your part. I won't
require that you give this information if you don't want
to give it. ... If you do want to give it, then you must give
it all.40
Following his sua sponte request for "ability to pay" evi-
dence, the district judge chose not to diminish damages. On
appeal,"the Fourth Circuit sanctioned the trial judge's re-
quest by diminishing quantum based on the evidence solicited
by the lower court judge.41 The appellate court's implicit
sanction of the trial judge's action indicates that the only
limitation on a judge's power to raise the issue of a defen-
dant's inability to pay is the defendant's right to choose
whether to open up his financial affairs to the court.
While Louisiana courts desire to protect an impecunious
defendant from judgments that would destroy his capacity to
adequately support himself, they do not clearly indicate how
much diminution is proper. Courts have generally held that
diminution "should not be carried to extremes," 42 and the
second circuit has observed that the "principle is not in-
tended to completely relieve a defendant of liability for repa-
ration of damages ... nor should it be considered as justifying
the reduction of the allowance of damages to a bare
minimum. . .. -43 Even with these limitations a disparity
39. Trial record of Davis v. McKey, Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, Division "C", No. 380-411, at 291.
40. Id. at 294.
41. Davis v. McKey, 167 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La.
910, 168 So. 2d 822 (1964).
42. E.g., Smith v. Freeman, 31 So. 2d 524, 526 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947). See
Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 So. 2d 694
(1973); Williams v. Garner, 268 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
43. Lacaze v. Horton, 100 So. 2d 252, 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958). The court
further stated: "Either of these alternatives, in our opinion, would be an
extreme application of the principle and would result in effecting a gross
injustice toward a plaintiff, under the guise of the application of a humane
consideration for the plight of an impecunious defendant." Id. 'at 255. The
latter language suggests grounds for constitutional attack based on the due
[Vol. 36
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exists between cases where quantum was lowered slightly to
aid a defendant not quite able to pay a full judgment 44 and
cases where a plea of poverty resulted in substantial relief to
the defendant.4 5 Perhaps the disparity results from the broad
discretion which Louisiana Civil Code article 1934(3) gives
the trial court in fixing quantum. 46 Louisiana courts have
attempted to maintain uniformity in the assessment of dam-
ages by referring to the amounts set by past decisions in
cases of a similar nature. 47 However, the courts recognize
that no hard and fast rule exists for fixing damages and that
other cases serve merely as guides for the trial court in exer-
cising its discretion. 8
process clause. Judicial application of the doctrine represents state action
and restricts a plaintiff's ability to claim a pecuniary interest to which he is
otherwise fully entitled. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (defining
pecuniary interest); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)
(court action is included within the definition of "state action"); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1947); text at notes 1-4, supra (under Louisiana law a
plaintiff is entitled to a full reparation for damage sustained). Under tradi-
tional fourteenth amendment analysis, the due process clause requires that
the "challenged [state action] be a rational means of advancing a valid state
interest." Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1973). Louisiana
courts have stated that the ability to pay doctrine prevents the courts from
granting "vain and useless" judgments and thus presumably preserves the
integrity of the courts and promotes judicial efficiency. However, the stated
objective will only be achieved if the court is able to precisely calculate at the
time of trial the defendant's potential for future wealth. An impecunious
defendant might obtain future wealth by way of unsuspected inheritance,
salary increase, or other means. Absent the "ability to pay" obstacle, a
plaintiff unable to satisfy his judgment by immediate execution could seize
such future wealth at any time during the life of the judgment. Since even
the most destitute defendant might obtain future wealth, arguably the pre-
sumption that a full judgment is incapable of execution does not reasonably
promote either judicial integrity or efficiency, and therefore violates the
fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, if the ability to pay doctrine is viewed
primarily as a means to afford relief to the impecunious defendant, although
application of the doctrine may be a rational means of furthering that objec-
tive, the purported state interest may conflict with federal bankruptcy law
and be considered as preempted by federal law and policy.
44. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nichols, 254 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
45. Urk v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1965); Termini v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 19 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944).
46. In Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1006-07, 245 So. 2d 151,
155 (1971), the Louisiana Supreme Court held: "Where there is a legal right
to recovery but the damages cannot be exactly estimated, the courts have
reasonable discretion to assess same based upon all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case."
47. E.g., Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963).
48. E.g., Wilcox v. B. Olinde & Sons Co., 182 So. 149, 154 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1938).
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Evidence and Procedure
Louisiana courts have not required the defendant to
plead facts concerning his limited financial position as a req-
uisite for introduction of such evidence at trial.4 9 Their le-
niency apparently hinges on the belief that inability to pay is
not an affirmative defense, because it does not defeat the
plaintiff's cause of action but rather allows only a limited
recovery.50 In Williams v. Garner,51 the plaintiff urged that the
trial court erred by allowing the defendant to introduce evi-
dence of his inability to pay when the issue had not been
brought to plaintiff's attention by defendant's pleadings. The
first circuit found no error on the part of the trial court,
observing that the remedy for surprise in such a case is to
move for a continuance to afford the plaintiff an opportunity
to investigate.
Louisiana courts have further enhanced the possibility of
surprise to the plaintiff by refusing to allow him to investi-
gate, via pretrial discovery, the possibility of a belated de-
fense of inability to pay. In Benoit v. International Harvester
Co., 52 the third circuit pointed out three reasons for refusing
discovery of the defendant's financial situation: "lack of rele-
vancy of the defendant's financial condition to the nature of
this case," 53 invasion of the defendant's "right to privacy and
right to refrain from disclosing his confidential affairs,"
and absence of prejudicial surprise to the plaintiff.55 The
court's failure to find relevancy and prejudicial surprise is
itself surprising since any evidence introduced concerning
defendant's ability to pay must be considered in assessing
damages, 56 regardless of whether the plaintiff has been
forewarned of the defense via the defendant's pleadings. 57
The defendant's inability to respond in quantum cannot
49. E.g., Williams v. Garner, 268 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
50. Id. See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1005.
51. 268 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
52. 251 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
53. Id. at 390.
54. Id., citing Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (1962).
55. Id.
56. See text at notes 49-52, supra.
57. ld. Although the court realized that the defense of inability to pay
could be raised at trial, it apparently felt that since liability was the central
issue, allowing pretrial discovery of the defendant's ability to pay would
merely permit the plaintiff to exploit the defendant's financial resources.
[Vol. 36
COMMENTS
be presumed; 58 rather, the defendant has the burden, as with
his other defenses, to prove his inability to respond fully in
damages. 59 Courts will allow a defendant to introduce virtu-
ally any evidence relevant to his ability to pay. Factors which
have been considered are the defendant's earning capacity,60
financial responsibility,6 1 financial worth, 62 insurance cover-
age, 63 potential future income,64 debts,65 family expenses,6 6
and living expenses. 67 The defendant's burden of proof may
be tempered by the judge's option 68 to elicit such evidence at
trial even though the defendant failed to raise the issue.
Grounds for Attack
At least two avenues of attack are available to a plaintiff
confronted with a defendant's plea of inability to pay. First,
application of the ability to pay doctrine may be an abuse of
judicial discretion, contrary to the spirit of Louisiana Civil
Code articles 2315 and 1934(3). Traditionally, article 2315 has
required complete reparation of an aggrieved party,6 9 but
when applied, the ability to pay doctrine precludes full indem-
nity for the plaintiffs loss. Although one might argue that
the general rule of complete reparation in article 2315 is
modified by the trial court's discretion in article 1934(3) and
that such discretion permits the reduction of quantum based
on the defendant's meager means, the more persuasive ar-
gument is that the court's discretionary power was added to
article 1934 solely for the purpose of providing a fair means of
58. Howell v. Knight, 193 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
59. Hilburn v. Johnson, 240 So. 2d 767 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
60. Nichols v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 261 La. 229, 259 So. 2d 75 (1972).
61. Termini v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,.19 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944).
62. Trahan v. Continental Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970);
Cole v. Sherrill, 7 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
63. Trahan v. Continental Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
64. Jagers v. Royal Indemn. Co., 257 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Williams v. Garner, 268 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1972).
65. See Smith v. Girley, 242 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, 260 La. 223, 255 So. 2d 748 (1§71); Danove v. Mahoney, 176 So.
404 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
66. DeShazo v. Cantrelle, 165 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
246 La. 860, 167 So. 2d 674 (1964).
67. Nichols v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
68. See text at notes 39-41, supra.
69. See cases cited in notes 2, 3, supra.
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determining the amount of complete reparation when the
value of harm sustained is indefinite. 70
The ability to pay doctrine may also conflict with the
National Bankruptcy Act,7 1 which preempts conflicting state
laws.72 Because of its insolvency characteristics, Louisiana's
jurisprudential ability to pay doctrine may well fit within the
category of state laws suspended due to conflict with the
federal bankruptcy power. In International Shoe v. Pinkus,73
the United States Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas
insolvency statute because it interfered with the Bankruptcy
Act. The court held that intolerable inconsistencies and con-
fusion would develop if the state statute were given effect
while the federal act is in force. 74 Louisiana's ability to'pay
doctrine also causes inconsistencies subject to attack under
the reasoning of International Shoe. For example, if a defen-
dant is allowed the prejudgment relief of diminution based on
his inability to pay and the postjudgment relief of bankrupt-
cy, the plaintiff's claim is twice exposed to diminution while
the claims of the defendant's other creditors are exposed to
diminution only in the bankruptcy proceeding.7 5 The purpose
of the federal bankruptcy system76 would be better served if
the plaintiff were initially awarded his full rights of recovery,
70. In Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1006-07, 245 So. 2d 151,
155 (1971), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "One injured through the
fault of another is entitled to full indemnification for the damages caused
thereby. Civil Code Art. 2315. Another general principle deduced therefrom
and applicable here may be stated as follows: [w]here there is a legal right to
recovery but the damages cannot be exactly estimated, the courts have
reasonable discretion to assess same based upon all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. Civil Code Art. 1934(3) ... "
71. 11 U.S.C. 1-1255 (1970).
72. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). Congressional power to
preempt state action regarding bankruptcy is implied from the constitu-
tional grant of power to Congress to enact uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States. International Shoe Co. v. Pin-
kus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
73. 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
74. Id. See also Duffy v. His Creditors, 122 La. 600, 48 So. 120 (1909);
Anderson v. His Creditors, 33 La. Ann. 1155 (1881).
75. But cf. Becnel v. Ward, 286 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (1974) (the ability to pay doctrine was not applied
because a reduction of all general damages would not save the defendants
from bankruptcy respecting special damages). No case other than Becnel has
discussed the effects of bankruptcy relative to the ability to pay doctrine.
76. The overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to provide an equitable
distribution of the bankrupt's estate. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
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forcing an impecunious defendant to seek relief in bank-
ruptcy.
Conclusion
If the "ability to pay" doctrine were eliminated from
Louisiana law, low-income defendants would be adequately
protected since post-judgment relief is available in
Louisiana for debtors with financial difficulties. Louisiana
law has traditionally aided debtors by exempting from sei-
zure a substantial portion of the property needed by the
debtor to care for himself and his family.77 Indeed, the legis-
lative purpose of enacting exemptions 78 is identical with the
reason for diminishing judgments based on a defendant's
financial condition: protection of a poor defendant's financial
capability to provide for himself and his family in order that
they will not be left a burden upon society.7 9 Additionally,
judgment debtors in Louisiana may obtain relief from federal
straight bankruptcy, 0 cession,81 and protection from con-
tempt penalties. 82
Louisiana should consider as a matter of policy whether
the ability to pay device should be abolished. The state policy
of protecting impecunious defendants could be carried out
satisfactorily absent the ability to pay doctrine in view of the
functional problems in its application, the inequity to plain-
tiffs, and the protective and rehabilitative devices otherwise
available to a poor defendant once a judgment has become
final.
R. Bryan McDaniel
77. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 9 and art. XIV, § 34; LA. R.S. 22:647 (Supp.
1958); LA. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1960), as amended by La. Acts 1961, No. 25, Sec.
1 and La. Acts 1972, No. 530; LA. R.S. 9:2601-74 (1950).
78. Lambeth v. Milton, 2 Rob. 81 (La. 1842). See also Note, 11 TUL. L.
REV. 145, 146 (1936).
79. Benoit v. International Harvester Co., 251 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1971); Cole v. Sherrill, 7 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
80. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970).
81. LA. R.S. 9:2601-74 (1950).
82. LA. R.S. 13:4206 (1950).
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